The Foreign Press Association of Greece letter was sent to its president, A.C. Sedgwick, the Athens Bureau chief of the New York Times and son-in-law of Times heavyweight columnist C. L. Sulzberger. Though Sedgwick competed with Elias for stories, he was so angry at the letter’s tone and content that he wrote a blistering reply to Yerxa on 29 November, reading in part:
Insofar as this letter was addressed to the Foreign Press Association I felt free, indeed compelled, to permit the members to read it. A number of them, myself included, felt that both the tone and language employed suggest defamation and positive harm to our colleague’s reputation as a journalist and to his prestige…
Mr. Demetracopoulos is known here to be an enterprising newspaperman, held in high esteem. He has been able to produce letters from the Herald Tribune News Service editors showing that those editors placed confidence in him. That suddenly, and that for no reason we know of, the accepted estimate of the man was thrown into reverse has left many of us wondering if some character assassin has not found his mark for personal gain.
Ultimately, Yerxa’s libels hurt Elias more than the unexpected termination. Elias contacted a lawyer in New York with the thought of suing the Herald Tribune to “rescind the aspersions cast.”26 He did not expect to get his job back, but he wanted a retraction and an apology.
12.A Dark Side of Camelot
THE CIA ATTACK ON ELIAS through the Herald Tribune was but one shot in a fusillade. Half a century later, many documents have been destroyed or are still heavily redacted; the full scope of this nefarious campaign may never be known.1 At the end of November 1960, after telling other agencies it “would like derogative information,” CIA deputy director Richard Helms prepared a four-page memorandum to US Naval Intelligence, the Department of the Army, the State Department, and the USIA, claiming that Demetracopoulos, “regardless of whether or not he was the witting instrument of hostile interests…is a trouble-maker who has misused any contact with US officials or institutions, and such contact should be avoided wherever possible.”2
Nevertheless, in early January 1961, Elias flew to the United States to cover the presidential inauguration of John Fitzgerald Kennedy and report on what the change of administrations might mean for Greece. He also wanted to conduct a series of high-profile interviews that he could place in his different papers upon his return.
He found Washington more festive than on past visits and was delighted to be back with Louise Gore, now his Fairfax Hotel landlady. Although a Republican Party stalwart who had worked hard for Nixon, she now graciously welcomed guests from around the world to the inauguration of a Democratic president.
In the weeks leading up to the inauguration, Elias was all business. Members of the State Department were apoplectic that, despite their objections, he repeatedly scored interviews with top American officials. Demetracopoulos even arranged a brief meeting with vice president–elect Lyndon Johnson at his Senate office and received a written response to previously submitted questions.3
When Demetracopoulos interviewed Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Burke was in the last months of an unprecedented third term, one which Kennedy had asked him to complete.4 Dwight D. Eisenhower was still President, but the interview would not appear until after the change in administration, and this timing “put a whole new complexion on a relatively minor event,” Elias later wrote.5
Elias’s acquaintance with Burke went back to the mid-1950s. As a Cold War strategic planner and programmer, the 59-year-old admiral was a celebrated war hero and anti-Soviet hawk, unafraid to speak his mind.6 The two men had had many discussions about the requirements of modern navies in a nuclear age and the degree to which a calibrated “flexible response” involving non-nuclear weapons was better than “massive retaliation.” They had some political differences, especially regarding the Greek royal family, but they respected each other.
At two o’clock sharp on January 12, 1961, Elias entered the admiral’s imposing Pentagon office. Before beginning the interview, Elias updated Burke on his ongoing battle with the US Embassy in Athens over his interviews with Navy brass. He also told him of his suspicious firing by the Herald Tribune. Off the record, the admiral offered to help. In the formal interview, Burke provocatively said he didn’t think Russia would “dare start a general nuclear war, because she will be destroyed.”7 And in response to a question about Soviet Communist Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s threats that the Soviet Union would not tolerate Sixth Fleet exercises in the Black Sea, Burke forcefully asserted that the “Black Sea is an international body of water…and in international waters, we will go anywhere we please and [the Soviet Union] won’t stop us—neither will anyone else.”8
Elias knew immediately Admiral Burke had given him great material. He recalled that “to insure no complaints about the text, Admiral Burke and I agreed to have the transcript approved by the Department of the Navy. Several days later the Navy returned it to me, with the upper right corner stamped: ‘No objection to publication on grounds of national security.’ ” Someone had written by hand, “Courtesy Review.”9 In the middle of the stamped block was the date: JAN 16, 1961.
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INAUGURATION DAY, JANUARY 20, was bitterly cold and snowy, and Elias didn’t even try to brave the weather and the crowds to get a good vantage point along the parade route. He watched Kennedy’s address and other pageantry on television from the warmth of the Fairfax Hotel, near a crackling fireplace, with Louise Gore and a bipartisan group of onlookers. After the inauguration, Elias completed his remaining interviews and returned to Athens, via New York.
The day after the Burke interview, outgoing President Eisenhower went on national television and radio and delivered his Farewell Address to the American People, warning about the dangers of a growing military industrial complex. The tone of the valedictory speech contributed to the incoming administration’s eagerness to make sure it was viewed as not only strong on defense, but that substantively and symbolically the military was under its civilian control. Desiring better relations with the Soviet Union, the Kennedy Administration did not want any loose-lipped generals or admirals saying things that would inflame tempers in Moscow. It would strictly enforce a longstanding rule that no military official could make a public statement without formal clearance.
Burke accepted the concept of civilian control of the military. Although he didn’t have the same personal relationship with the new president as he had had with his predecessor, he respected the office and, initially, Kennedy himself. He also told Elias he admired the intelligence of the new Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara but was troubled by his inexperience. Burke was greatly displeased by the arrogant attitude of junior officials at the Pentagon who projected the sense that “any civilian was superior to any military officer.”10
Later in January, Admiral Burke, as instructed, submitted to the Defense Secretary the draft of a speech prepared for his January 27 acceptance of the Silver Quill Award. In the draft, he said the Russians could not be trusted. Around January 23 he was informed that the text was unacceptable. Burke and his speechwriter prepared a new draft, which passed muster. Word of this wrist-slap soon leaked out. As he suggested in later testimony to Congress, Burke was more miffed at the public disclosure than the initial rejection. He suspected the leak came from Arthur Sylvester, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and was meant to embarrass him.
Before departing Washington, Elias had given the English version of his January 12 interview to his NANA editor Sid Goldberg, with the understanding it would be embargoed until he could translate it into Greek for Ethnos and Makedonia and prepare an English version for the Athens Daily Post.11 It took him until February 15 to get everything ready for the interview’s release. The syndicated story, featuring Burke’s provocative language, was widely headlined in papers in Greece, Britain, and the United States.12 “I enjoyed writing that article,” Elias remembered, “but I never dreamed it would be a bombshell.”
Explode it did. The Kennedy White House and the Defense Department were furious. In his February 1 and February 8 press conferences, President Kennedy had put his personal stamp of approval on the policy of military personnel pre-clearing any public pronouncements.13 The simultaneous international publication of Elias’s February 15 front-page stories looked to Burke’s superiors as if the admiral was purposely challenging the young president. Rumors spread quickly that some in the new administration wanted the Eisenhower holdover fired for disrespect. At the same time, administration opponents jumped quickly to Burke’s defense. Barry Goldwater led other senators in attacking the White House for “muzzling” military leaders.14
In his defense, Burke clarified that he had consulted his log and that the interview had been conducted before the inauguration, while Eisenhower was still president. The Kennedy Administration did not believe him. An anti-Burke campaign was organized by Arthur Sylvester and Pierre Salinger, the new White House press secretary. Asked by candidate Kennedy in early 1960 what would be the first thing he’d do if elected president, a drunken Arthur Sylvester, then a reporter for the Newark Evening News, had replied that he’d “shut the mouths of every General and Admiral…[who] seem to speak with more authority than elected…officeholders.”15 Kennedy and Salinger remembered this and had him appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense. Now, as Salinger’s designated “armpit nuzzler,” Sylvester warned that military control required that Burke be brought to heel.16
President Kennedy was asked about the Burke interview during his February 15 press conference at the State Department, the same day the article appeared. He replied: “I have been informed…that the interview was given on January 12, which was before the Administration took over on January 20 and before we gave any indication that we would like all statements dealing with national security to be coordinated.” The President went on to joke that “I would say that this makes me happier than ever that such a directive has gone out.”17
The press corps tittered, but it was no laughing matter for the White House.18 Privately Kennedy was livid, and members of his staff knew it. The White House viewed Burke’s blunt remarks as a right-wing assault and remained unconvinced that the interview had been conducted before Kennedy took office. Sylvester held a press briefing in which he told reporters that neither Burke nor Elias should be believed.19 In its lead story the next day, the New York Post asked: “Now where were you Mr. Demetracopoulos on the day of January 12?”20
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ON THE DAY after the presidential press conference, Pierre Salinger summoned the CIA to the White House for a briefing. “Lucky Pierre” was a tough, inside-politics player whom Jack Kennedy had picked to run his presidential campaign press operation after watching him help Bobby Kennedy during the Estes Kefauver hearings on racketeering. However, Salinger was originally kept out of the loop on sensitive matters of state. For example, he knew nothing about the Bay of Pigs planning. Shut out of real policy-making decisions, Salinger welcomed any attention from agents and desk officers elsewhere in the administration, and they in turn were only too pleased to feed him their anti-Demetracopoulos misinformation. Gregarious and jovial as he could be, Salinger had a peculiar fondness for conspiracy theories—so much so that decades later the term “Pierre Salinger Syndrome” was coined to describe “the condition of thinking that everything one reads on the Internet is true.”21 Sitting in his White House office the day after the interview broke, Salinger fingered a white business card someone had given him: “Elias Demetracopoulos, Political Editor, Ethnos, Makedonia, Athens Post, Omonia Street, Athens.” He started immediately to coordinate a search for the whereabouts of Elias and any and all intelligence “traces” about his background.22
From Athens, Ambassador Briggs expressed outrage at the Burke interview, characterizing it as Elias’s “zooming up and down the Mediterranean (and Black Sea to boot) with US Sixth Fleet, hand-in-hand with Admiral Burke; with every funnel belching sparks and missiles guided and unguided spinning in all directions.”23 The CIA’s Stanley Grogan sent the White House a “Secret” CIA follow-up titled “Restored Prestige of Ilias Dimitrakopoulos [sic] Since His Trip to US,” in which he reported that, despite the attacks from Karamanlis and his “lost status” after being “dropped” by the Herald Tribune, Demetracopoulos was:
getting back nearly all of his former prestige. He has, in the face of known opposition of the Greek government, contrived to achieve a status which compels many within his profession and without (e.g. the military) to conclude with some reluctance that Dimitrakopoulos has in fact very close relations with high-standing people in the United States. Regardless of whether he is an American agent or not, Ilias Dimitrakopoulos [sic] has the stories which appeal to Greek nationalist readers, since the stories deal in many cases with American foreign and military policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.
…Since Dimitrakopoulos’ return and subsequent to his journalistic success, the atmosphere toward him in the Greek Parliament has changed. Opposition politicians and ERE (National Radical Union) deputies alike seek him out in an effort to assure that their views on every imaginable subject are conveyed to high American circles.24
Soon after, State Department security officers started to build a case to block Elias’s further travel to the United States. They re-circulated reports from the early 1950s that claimed he had lied on his visa application, was “not a recognized journalist,” and was considered by an earlier US ambassador to be a “mental case.”25 Meanwhile, a choleric CIA complained that Elias’s articles “continue to have a damaging effect upon US prestige in Greece and NATO harmony” and asserted he had “probable ties with an unknown group or organization.”26 Of particular concern to the CIA’s deputy director of plans was a “substantially accurate but incomplete account of a forthcoming NATO practice exercise, CHECKMATE.”27 A befuddled Briggs concluded that Demetracopoulos obviously had access to classified information given him by “person or persons unknown,” a conclusion perhaps bolstered in March when a high-level Greek government official, outraged by a Demetracopoulos-bylined newspaper article, characterized the journalist “as an American agent not subject to the control of the embassy or State Department.”28
Pierre Salinger remained furious at Elias after the events of February 1961, becoming one of the most incessant drumbeaters bent on destroying the Greek journalist.29 For years, and long after the Kennedy White House era, Salinger rarely missed an opportunity to pass on unfounded rumors regarding Demetracopoulos, even calling the Greek’s high-profile friends and business associates to warn them that this “charmer” was really a fraud, a Communist, a double agent, and worse.30
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WHEN ELIAS, BACK in Greece, got word of the controversy in Washington, he confirmed Burke’s recollection that the interview had indeed taken place more than a week before the inauguration. He explained that, as was his custom, the interview had been transcribed and returned to Burke for corrections and confirmation and that he had in his possession the Navy copy stamped January 16, 1961. To his surprise, Ambassador Briggs called him shortly thereafter and for the first time invited him to a private dinner at his residence. As a seeming afterthought, he asked Elias to bring with him the original copy of the Burke interview. Elias, sensing something amiss, brought with him a copy, not the original. During the meal, the ambassador asked for the transcript. Elias said he’d brought a copy and that Briggs was welcome to it.
Briggs was displeased not to receive the original and said that others would be displeased as well. Pointedly, he warned Elias that the President’s brother and ruthless enforcer, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, was personally looking into this matter, and that Elias’s non-cooperation could cause him “big trouble.” Elias still declined to produce the original. Later that evening he discovered that his office on Omonia Street had been broken into and ransacked.31 His files had been searched, but it appeared that nothing was taken. Luckily, before going to dinner, he had taken the precaution of placing the original interview transcript in a bank safety deposit box in downtown Athens.
The following day, Demetracopoulos received several transatlantic telephone calls from people at the State Department urging that he not support Burke.32 They, as well as embassy officials in Athens, noted that “it’s a new administration” and that, if he cooperated, his past problems would disappear, and he’d enjoy increased access to exclusive interviews. As a sweetener, arrangements could be made to have his relationship with the Herald Tribune reinstated. Elias’s response was quick and unequivocal. He asked his editors to arrange to have his story reprinted, this time with a photostat of the interview cover sheet containing the Navy “approval” box and the January 16, 1961 date highlighted in boldface. On February 19, Makedonia ran the interview and article again on its front page, with an introductory note and the Navy stamp.
An embarrassed Kennedy Administration stepped up its harassment of Elias and his sources. A World Bank executive who’d given Elias an interview was told by the FBI not to do it again. At the same time, Elias gained entry to a network of right-wing congressional conservatives who were furious at the shabby treatment of their beloved Admiral Burke. The confrontation with Burke was the first salvo in a partisan battle. New Hampshire Republican Senator Styles Bridges called for hearings on Kennedy’s treatment of the military. Mississippi Senator John Stennis convened his Armed Services Special Preparedness Subcommittee and later issued a report critical of the administration. Elias joined the fray, preparing a pro–Sixth Fleet editorial that was inserted into the Congressional Record.33 Later, he editorialized against the muzzling of the US military.34
The White House distrust of Burke and his Pentagon allies may have contributed to the President’s decision to give the CIA broad leeway and leave the military relatively in the dark in the run-up to the Bay of Pigs. Late in the evening of April 16, at the conclusion of the annual congressional reception in the East Room of the White House, President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in white tie and tails, along with General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Burke, in dress uniforms and medals, gathered in the Oval Office to monitor the invasion that was to begin at midnight.
According to Burke’s biographer, E. B. Potter, Richard M. Bissel of the CIA informed Kennedy that although the situation was bad, it “could still take a favorable turn if the President would authorize sending in aircraft from the carrier.”35 Burke concurred, arguing for American naval intervention. “Let me take two jets and shoot down the enemy aircraft,” he urged. But President Kennedy said “No,” reminding them that he had said “over and over” that he would not commit US forces to combat, knowing that this would broadcast to the world the truth that the whole expedition had been conceived, planned, and armed by the United States. Burke then suggested sending in a destroyer. Whereupon Kennedy exploded. “Burke,” he snapped, “I don’t want the United States involved in this.”36
“Hell, Mr. President,” Burke snapped back, “but we are involved.” One can reasonably assume that the dust-up between the two men two months before colored this unpleasant exchange.37
Burke’s August retirement hardly meant a diminution of Demetracopoulos’s high-level access to Navy sources, since his successor was none other than Admiral George W. Anderson, who had provided the September 1960 interview that had provoked the CIA to demand Elias’s firing. Just a few weeks before he assumed his new position, Admiral Anderson wrote to Elias, thanking him for an Athens Post editorial supportive of the US Navy and warmly inviting him to come see him on his next visit. 38
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