Riding a boom in the world economy, the junta incentivized foreign investment and introduced ultimately inflationary measures. People traded their ancestral homes for residences in new concrete apartment buildings. Tourism was promoted heavily to soften the junta’s international image.22 Holiday visitors came, including George Harrison of the Beatles, despite appeals from junta opponents for a boycott. Greek-American vacationers praised the country’s new leadership for stopping strikes and making trains run on time.23 Tom Pappas was in the ascendancy, with former employees and friends well-positioned in the regime.
Behind closed doors, the military security police continued its campaign of torture and extracted confessions. Staged international inspections of prisoner conditions led to whitewashed reports, but independent European investigators were hearing horror stories. Elias received phone calls, smuggled tapes, and journals, all asking for help.
The opposition, however, was scattered and disorganized. George Papandreou and Panagiotis Kanellopoulos were under house arrest in Athens. Andreas Papandreou was in Sweden; Konstantinos Karamanlis in Paris; Eleni Vlachou in London; and Elias in Washington. The King was in Rome, his failed December 1967 coup attempt already a faded memory. An army deserter and poet, Alekos Panagoulis, attempted to assassinate Papadopoulos by bombing the dictator’s moving car. He missed, and was caught, imprisoned, and brutally tortured. The regime talked about restoring parliamentary democracy when conditions were ready, but few believed them. Some agreed with the sentiment that “every few decades the Greeks need a Metaxas or a Papadopoulos to bring order and get everybody moving in the same direction.”24
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ONE OF THE first calls Elias made when he arrived in self-exile was to Spiro Agnew. The appointment was easily arranged. He visited the Maryland governor’s office in Annapolis in November 1967 to urge him to commit to the cause of Greek democracy, and especially to oppose resumption of US arms shipments to the dictatorship. Agnew was cordial, but balked, telling him that for political reasons he could not publicly oppose the junta. He did, however, promise to be neutral.
A couple of months later, Louise Gore brought Agnew to a Republican Women’s Club dinner in New York, and invited Richard Nixon to stop by her postprandial reception to meet the governor, who was then a leading supporter of Nelson Rockefeller’s incipient candidacy. After the men talked for two hours, Louise walked Nixon to the elevator, and he said: “Your governor—make him speak out more. He’s got a lot to say.”25 Back in Washington, she shared with Elias her observations from the evening.
For months, Agnew had been making clandestine trips to New York to meet with Rockefeller to plot the latter’s presidential candidacy. When Agnew’s benefactor Tom Pappas urged him to back Nixon instead, Agnew demurred, forming instead a Committee to Draft Rockefeller for the Republican nomination, with headquarters in Annapolis. Unexpectedly, on March 21, Rockefeller announced that he would drop out of the race, without ever having alerted Agnew—a crushing embarrassment.
After President Johnson announced on March 30 that he would not run for reelection, Rockefeller reconsidered, and by the end of April he had formally reannounced his candidacy. By then the jilted Agnew had met again in New York with Nixon, embraced his candidacy, and enthusiastically worked to beat back the Rockefeller challenge.
After he was nominated, Nixon had still not chosen his running mate, though it was clear he wanted a low-profile, ideological centrist willing to play second fiddle.26 After three rounds of meetings, polarizing figures like Illinois senator Charles Percy, New York mayor John Lindsay, and California governor Ronald Reagan were eliminated, leaving under consideration Tennessee Senator Howard Baker, Maryland congressman Rogers Morton, Massachusetts governor John Volpe, California lieutenant governor Robert Finch, and Maryland’s “favorite son,” Agnew. Over the years much has been made of Tom Pappas’s intimations and boasts that his opinion was decisive in Agnew’s getting Nixon’s nod, but there’s no evidence that his voice was considered more important than the hundreds of letters and recommendations Nixon solicited from party leaders. Pappas also told reporters he had urged Nixon to pick Percy or Volpe.27 At a meeting with the vice-presidential selection deadline fast approaching, Nixon and his closest advisors concluded that everyone on the final list had flaws. Agnew won by default.28
Instantly, Agnew became the highest-profile Greek political figure in the world. It didn’t matter that he couldn’t speak Greek, didn’t follow the Greek Orthodox religion, refused to give his children Greek names, had married a non-Greek, had a non-Greek mother, preferred to be called “Ted,” and had only a rudimentary understanding of Greek history, culture, and current politics. His nomination became a source of pride for Greeks everywhere, and his views of Greece were already a matter of great importance.
Elias watched the Republican Convention in Miami Beach, with VIP tickets provided courtesy of South Carolina senator and Nixon insider Strom Thurmond. Although Thurmond had become an unabashed supporter of the junta, his personal relationship with Elias, which dated back to the Admiral Burke interview days, was amicable. Even if Elias had a low opinion of Thurmond’s intellect and hard-right views, he remained grateful for Thurmond’s help in his reinstatement at the Herald Tribune and was friendly with his top staffers Harry Dent and Fred Buzhardt.
As he watched Agnew’s selection and acceptance speech, Elias experienced a touch of ethnic pride in Agnew’s ascent. He liked being on a first-name basis with political leaders, and he was particularly happy for Louise Gore. This feeling was quickly replaced by a feeling of discomfort once he realized that the man sitting next to Pat Nixon in the presidential box at the convention was Tom Pappas.
Elias viewed the world through the prism of Greek democracy, and thus saw Pappas as a symbol of those reaping rewards from championing the military regime. As long as Agnew was at least neutral regarding the Greek junta, Elias was comfortable overlooking stories about Agnew’s seamy scandals while county commissioner. Garden variety US political corruption was not Elias’s focus. But rumors that influential businessmen in Greece and some Greek-Americans with financial interests in both countries—including Pappas—had given Agnew large amounts of cash and encouraged him to defend the military dictatorship troubled him. Elias suggested to some reporters that they explore links between Pappas, Agnew, and Nixon, but, lacking easy corroboration, no news publication did any serious follow-up. 29
Demetracopoulos wanted Agnew to reconfirm his neutrality because any change in his position could undermine opposition to the dictators’ plebiscite, scheduled for the end of September. He asked Louise Gore, now working on “practical politics” for the Agnew campaign, to arrange a face-to-face meeting with the candidate. At the early September gathering, Agnew promised Gore and Demetracopoulos, for at least a third time, that he would remain neutral. His eye contact was direct; his hand gestures demonstrative, and he even used language that hinted he was sympathetic to the movement to “restore democracy.” It was therefore with great pleasure that Elias accepted an invitation to sit with Louise at the head table at the National Press Club less than a week later, on Friday September 27, when Agnew would be the featured speaker. Agnew’s speech consisted mainly of predictable Republican talking points. As he droned on, Elias found himself drifting off. Suddenly, the Washington Star’s Mary McGrory asked the vice-presidential candidate if he were “for or against the Greek junta.”30 Elias sat up straight. Agnew paused, perhaps for effect, before answering. He then pulled out a typewritten sheet from his inside jacket pocket, squinted his eyes, and read from a prepared statement.
I think the Greek military government that took over in 1967 has not proven itself to be as horrendous a spectre to contemplate as most people thought it would. I think as long as they are seriously living up to their obligations…There’s supposed to be a referendum this Sunday on the Constitution and I think they have promised free elections thereafter…[T]his particular military government has done a bit to stabilize the Communist threat in Greece.31
Agnew went on to criticize “the Communist forces under Andreas Papandreou,” and blamed him for “stimulating attempts of an uprising.”32 Asked whether that made him a Communist, the governor said: “a person who advocates the violent overthrow of a government…makes him undesirable.”
Sitting only feet away, Elias and Gore looked at each other speechless, stunned by the sudden change. At the end of the luncheon, Elias departed immediately for an appointment. Returning home, Gore rushed off to another meeting, but left Elias a handwritten note in his hotel mailbox expressing her dismay. Given her prominence in the Nixon-Agnew campaign, it was a remarkable document:
Elias I have been trying to call you—I am shocked!! What happened at the Press Club? That certainly wasn’t what I thought I was going to hear!!!!
You must be indignate [sic] and I can’t blame you. Why did Agnew tell us one thing one day and say something else the next??
It was bad enough that he told us he was going to be neutral. But then to turn around and support the regime. I can’t believe it!” she continued “What made him change his mind—or rather Who!”33
SHE CONCLUDED WITH: “What are you going to do?…You have every right to blast him. I’m really very sorry—damn!”
Demetracopoulos, acutely aware that worldwide publication of Agnew’s position would give aid and comfort to the colonels in the run-up to the Greek plebiscite, hastily organized a press conference for the next day. The purpose: to criticize Agnew’s comments, and warn that “Even a partial resumption of any kind of heavy military equipment…would be…throwing away the main leverage left to the U.S. Government to pressure the junta to move toward a real restoration of constitutional democracy.”34
The proposed Greek constitution, to be voted on the following day, had never been published fully in advance, and Elias attacked the “sham” plebiscite, designed to make the Greek people “accept the indefinite abolition of democratic government, individual freedom, and the rule of law.” Elias especially criticized draft provisions curtailing press freedoms for nine ambiguously defined offenses and a final article stating that provisions pertaining to individual freedoms of the press, parliament, and elections, as well as to guarantees against arbitrary arrest and judicial due process, “are not to be applied except as and when the military government decides.” Elias ended the conference by saying that Agnew’s “astounding” remarks at the National Press Club luncheon revealed the vice-presidential candidate’s “surprising ignorance of the Greek situation.”35 Despite scheduling the press conference on a Saturday morning, his plea and the Greek-against-Greek angle attracted coverage from wire services and foreign newspapers.36 Le Monde’s diplomatic correspondent included Elias’s appeal in his weekend column. Demetracopoulos also called friends at the Times of London to urge they explore the dark side of Agnew’s connections with Pappas and the Greek dictators. But, as his CIA monitors clucked happily in their report on Elias’s activities, neither the New York Times nor Washington Post picked up the story.37
The eleventh-hour appeal and the articles weren’t enough to make a difference. In Athens, Agnew’s ringing endorsement of the junta was given prominent play in the state-controlled press and made part of its election-eve propaganda. The referendum took place on Sunday, September 29. Voting was mandatory, with failure to vote a punishable offense. At some voting stations, ballots clearly marked “NO” were intentionally strewn on the floor in advance to intimidate voters. The result was a foregone conclusion: 92 percent were said to have voted yes, although a remarkable 22 percent of the electorate abstained.38
The military was now firmly in charge of the state, free from any governmental or parliamentary oversight. Without even a symbolic gesture toward civil liberties, a special Constitutional Court was created to be the junta’s watchdog over everyday life. This “referendum” provided the requisite fig leaf for the partial resumption of US military aid.
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TO HELP THE INS make a deportation case against Demetracopoulos, the CIA sought additional damaging information from the Greek dictatorship. The regime responded by sending a fabricated military record that described Elias’s profession as “electrician,” reported that he received multiple medical military deferments, and claimed he was permitted to go to the US in 1952 “for health reasons.” The deferrable maladies listed had nothing to do with his real health issues. Finally, the junta claimed he paid to get out of military service, ignoring the documentary evidence that his wartime record and time spent incarcerated by the enemy in World War II had exempted him from further service.39
Supporters of Elias actively lobbied the immigration authorities on his behalf, vouching for his character and integrity, his love for America, his heroic record against the Nazis and Communists, and the serious problems he would likely face because of his frontline opposition to the military regime in power. Among these were New York’s Republican senators Jacob Javits and Charles Goodell and Oregon Democratic senator Wayne Morse, retired General William Quinn, and William F. Kann, executive vice president of Bache & Co. After Labor Day, with no quota number yet available for natives of Greece and with Senate Bill S3650, Hartke’s private bill, languishing in committee and due to expire with the end of the legislative session, the INS commenced formal deportation proceedings. On September 18, Elias received a registered letter charging him with violating his non-immigrant status and was ordered to appear before a special inquiry officer on October 3 to “show cause why you should not be deported.”40
A few days later, he received a letter changing the date for his hearing to October 23. It seemed that the Rodenberg adultery charges that had been bubbling for much of the year had broken through the surface, and the INS investigators wanted that additional information to become part of the record. Under the law at the time, a finding of adultery by itself could not have been used against Elias in an immigration proceeding, but lying about it under oath could. Elias had given repeated accounts of the evening on pain and penalty of perjury. To the great disappointment of INS investigators, when the judge refused to refer any of Elias’s statements for prosecution, given the contradictory testimony from Rodenberg, Elias was cleared.
On October 23, Elias appeared before the special inquiry officer and admitted the fact of his Brimberg employment and therefore his deportability. Then, through his attorney, he requested a stay of deportation under the section of the immigration law that requires the attorney general to withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates that his “life or freedom would be threatened” thereby. In a supporting affidavit, Elias included his September 28 press conference statement, inserted in the Congressional Record by Utah senator Frank Moss, demonstrating his outspoken denunciation of the military regime and his active resistance to its leaders. He told the hearing officer he feared that if he returned to Greece, he would be killed.41
The hearing was suspended “until further notice.”42
18.Junta-gate and the O’Brien Gambit
1968 PROVED A YEAR OF missed opportunity for Elias Demetracopoulos, but it was not for lack of trying. In the final weeks of the campaign, Hubert Humphrey was rapidly closing a 15-point gap, and opinion polling the weekend before election day indicated a statistical dead heat.1 Nixon won by just 0.7 percent of the popular vote, receiving more than three million fewer votes than when he lost in 1960. The contest turned out to be the second-closest presidential election in the twentieth century. Had Nixon lost just 153,573 of his 35 million votes (0.21 percent of his national total) to his Democratic opponent in four battleground states (Missouri, Ohio, Illinois, and New Jersey), Humphrey would have won the electoral vote outright.
And there were other potential scenarios. A change from Nixon to Humphrey of only 41,971 votes (0.06 percent of national total) in three states (Missouri, New Jersey, and Arkansas) would have resulted in no Electoral College majority. So too if only California, while ousting its incumbent Republican US senator, had flipped. Either outcome would have resulted in the US House of Representatives deciding the election, and there the Democrats held a clear majority. In the closing days, Nixon was so concerned about the election being thrown into the House that, despite his strong frontrunner advantage and refusal to debate Humphrey, he nevertheless reached out to his grossly under-funded opponent to try to get him to agree that, if there were no Electoral College victor, the House should abide by the popular vote.2
Nixon had good reason to be worried as his once-titanic lead slipped away. Humphrey’s September 30 televised address in Salt Lake City, in which the vice president awkwardly and ambiguously tried to distance himself from President Johnson’s policies in Vietnam without alienating the President, won praise for its fresh and conciliatory tone. Some alienated Democrats returned to the fold. Meanwhile, a well-organized labor campaign relentlessly chipped away at third-party nominee George Wallace’s union support in the North.
While Humphrey was rising, private candidate polls showed Nixon support plateauing at about 40 percent. Polling data from the last month of the campaign indicated that Nixon was still particularly vulnerable on the trust issue.3 His support was soft—wide, but not deep. Notwithstanding an expensive and slick public-relations campaign, well chronicled in Joe McGinnis’s The Selling of the President, many people still did not like or trust Nixon and were uneasy voting for him. The Humphrey campaign sensed this weakness and focused their late campaign rhetoric on the “trust” issue. “In October, everyone suddenly got scared,” recalled McGinnis. “The bubble had burst. The months of staleness were catching up…fear [was] starting to creep up from deep inside.”4 On the Election Day cross-country flight to New York aboard the campaign plane Tricia, Nixon’s advisors anxiously picked at the reasons their candidate would lose.5
The third-party candidacy of the populist Alabama governor George Wallace, which eviscerated historic white Southern support for the Democratic Party, weakened during the year, but remained attractive enough to siphon anti-Humphrey votes and deprive Nixon of the full fruits of his Southern Strategy. In the end, Dixie gave Wallace forty-six electoral votes from six states. Democrats may have begun to lose the South, but Republican ascendancy had not yet fully kicked in. Fortunately for Nixon, this problem was more than offset by millions of disaffected Democrats who, upset by the administration’s handling of the Vietnam War and not sufficiently hostile to Nixon, decided to stay home. Total eligible voter turnout in 1968 was down to 60.8 percent, a drop of 2.3 percent from 1960. According to the University of Michigan Survey Research Center, more than a few Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy supporters even voted for Nixon as a protest vote.6
Ironically, Nixon was helped by many who in the past had been sharply critical of “Tricky Dick” and now wrote admiringly about a “new Nixon.” The week before the election, New York magazine featured as its cover story “Gloria Steinem on Learning to Live with Nixon.” Dismissing reported links between Tom Pappas, CIA money, and the junta, she wrote: “There’s little doubt that Nixon learned a great deal from his 1952 fund scandal, and is making every effort to be honest and/or circumspect…Humphrey’s staff doing “negative research”…hasn’t turned up anything unusual about financing; and…front-running candidates, rarely need to be dishonest…”7 Theodore White effusively explained that his chronicle—The Making of the President 1968—was designed to describe “the campaign of a man of courage and of conscience; and the respect it wrung from me.”8 An October Surprise in 1968—one in which Elias Demetracopoulos would have been a major player—could have changed the electoral outcome.
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DEMETRACOPOULOS COULD NOT believe that Agnew’s late-September endorsement of the Greek junta had been made for above-board reasons. Immediately, he drew on his contacts in high and low places. Knowing that his phone might be tapped by both Greek and US intelligence services, Elias avoided using his own room whenever possible. Louise Gore shared Elias’s views on the restoration of Greek democracy and knew that investigating the whys and whos of Agnew’s volte-face could be dangerous. Despite her prominent role in the Nixon-Agnew campaign, Louise was a loyal friend. She set Elias up in an unoccupied hotel room with what she thought would be a clean phone line.
