It’s hard to believe that Profumo entertained the idea of socialising with Ward’s friend Ivanov, since the Russian was known to the Security Service, and it was widely accepted that foreign embassy staff were often also working as agents. It would also have been easy for Profumo to stop moving in the same circles as Ward (who never concealed his support for communist ideology), especially after he was warned by MI5 about the anxieties it held about Ward’s ‘set’. Let’s make no bones about it, Profumo was not in love with Keeler, and later made several disparaging remarks about her intelligence and company. He might have just as easily moved on to the next pretty face. One whose friends were above suspicion.
But it’s also likely that as a rich and aristocratic, perhaps entitled, MP, Profumo was used to doing as he pleased and didn’t give the ramifications of his actions, public or private, much thought. MI5 files held at the National Archives show that when Profumo was first identified as knowing Ivanov through Ward, he was asked if he might help convince the attaché to work for the British Intelligence Service. His reply was that he thought ‘he ought to keep well away’ from such an activity. Perhaps if he had helped MI5 ‘turn’ a suspected spy, things might have gone very differently. He might have had grounds for the press-gagging D-notice he fancied after all.1
The timing of the revelations about the risk to national security the scandal raised was also important. Previous spy scandals had rocked the British government, and perhaps made it look less than competent, potentially damaging our reputation as the renewed ‘special relationship’ with the States was getting off the ground. When the Profumo scandal broke, it was a politically tense time for America, the Cold War was ongoing, and the thirty-five-day Cuban Missile Crisis confrontation of the previous year had soured many international relations. The British government was keen to prove it could be a trusted ally. The American administration was interested enough in the scandal to start its own investigation, codenamed ‘Bowtie’.
But was Profumo really duped into giving away secrets to Ward’s alleged spy ring? Keeler says Ward specifically asked her to ask Profumo when nuclear weapons would be delivered to Germany,2 and that in reply she begged him not to ask her to betray her country.
But when speaking to his son, Profumo is clear that he thought Keeler with her lack of education wasn’t clever enough to extract secrets from him. He explained she wasn’t a trained spy and that the two of them did not engage in any pillow talk during which Keeler might have had him at a disadvantage.3 David Profumo also says that on the matter of Keeler being used as a spy, even Ward told Denning that Keeler wouldn’t have been able get the required information from Profumo, implying that she wasn’t clever enough to have to asked such a question in a way that would not have been obvious to Profumo.4
Keeler says, however, that when she refused Ward’s request to ask her lover sensitive details, Ward then rang Hollis and saw to it that Profumo was made aware of Wagstaffe’s report on her.
Following this 9 August meeting between Profumo and Sir Norman Brook, she then received the infamous ‘Darling’ letter in which Profumo cancelled their plans to meet. However, Keeler says Profumo did not intend to stop seeing her completely but did suggest she moved out of Ward’s flat and away from his influence,5 saying that he could set her up in a flat himself.6 This request caused Keeler to finish things with Profumo and she expected not to see him again.
But, despite any security risks he had been warned about, it seems Profumo wasn’t that committed to ending it with Keeler, as David Profumo said his father seemed unclear on the actual date when the relationship finished. Profumo maintained the letter was him ending the relationship,7 but to an outsider, the ‘Darling’ letter reads as if Profumo might pick up his affair with Keeler again in September.
Keeler makes no bones about the fact that she believes Ward was a spy for Russia, and a well-connected one. She also believed that Ward manipulated her into relationships with both Profumo and Ivanov so that she would be able to ask sensitive information and also to place Profumo in a position of vulnerability for later blackmail. David Profumo says his father flew to the US in January and was involved in negotiating with Cyrus Vance, Kennedy’s Secretary to the Army. He was there to secure the assurance from the administration that it would assist in getting the Polaris missile system up and running, and that the two governments would work more closely together in the future,8 so he was certainly the right person to target for information.
But do we only have Keeler’s testimony that Ward was a spy and national security was at risk because of Profumo’s actions?
Keeler says Ward was clever enough to cover his tracks well. She believes Ward had convinced the Americans that she was the spy, and that the Bowtie files, comprising 1,189 pages, reveal that because of Ward’s misdirection, American authorities interrogated three American airmen who were thought to have been involved with her. She also says that the FBI, CIA and Air Force agents were investigating her and because of that knew all about her relationship with Profumo and Ivanov before the British government did.9 Keeler also suspects that the Americans were concerned that JFK could somehow be caught up in any espionage-sex ring that was operating at the time.
Keeler also says the files cover the leak over the Skybolt missile, the information which Keeler says Ward stole from Bill Astor,10 although much of it is redacted. Keeler adds that the documents accuse the British security services of stonewalling them.
Keeler’s book claims that the sex-for-cash accusations that she and Ward became a focus of during the Profumo scandal were simply a smokescreen to cover up the security risks both the British and American governments were concerned about.
Keeler also says that the police accepted Ward’s portrayal of her as a girl so in love with a calculating Russian agent that she would have done anything to stay with him, including cosying up to Profumo so she could gain access to his work files. She says that the police officers Herbert and Burrows questioned her twelve times at Marylebone police station, not about her being a prostitute and Ward her pimp, but about security and the Russian connection, and about when Ward had asked her to get information about the nuclear warheads from Profumo.11
Keeler first spoke about her dealings with Ward, Profumo and Ivanov to Detective Sergeant John Burrows when he had visited her in January ahead of the Edgecombe trial, to remind her and Rice-Davies that they would be called as witnesses. She’d told him then that Ward was a sexual pervert, that he procured women for men in high places and that Cliveden was a location for such meetings. Burrows had written up his findings in a report, including the claims that Ward was interested in atomic secrets. However, Marylebone CID had dismissed the claims initially.12
Eventually the questions moved more towards her relationship with Ward and the other men he had introduced her to. Then she says she was taken to see MI5’s Commander Townsend, who asked if it was Ward that was the spy, not her. Keeler reported that she said yes. She was returned to Herbert and Burrows, where the discussion turned to Peter Rachman and Rice-Davies, and the money and clothes the girls received from him. So, was it Ward rather than Keeler that Profumo was at risk from?
Not everyone agrees with Keeler’s claim that Ward was actively spying for the Russians, not least, and perhaps not surprisingly, John Profumo’s son David. He says that after the Edgecombe arrest, Keeler began selling her version of the story, which she continued with for decades,13 later adding that Keeler needed cash to support her lifestyle14 to explain how her claims might be financially motivated.
Ivanov denies that Ward was a spy. He admits in his book The Naked Spy that Ward wanted to mediate between hostile Cold War governments but says Ward was completely unsuited to espionage because of his personality. Ivanov says Ward was prone to gossiping and fantasy and had delusions of grandeur, suggesting that if Ward was let loose among the plots and counter-plots of the intelligence services, he would have scuppered everything.15 Instead, he describes Ward as someone not in touch with reality, who wanted to please everyone for his own vanity.
But despite not being a recruited agent, Ivanov does say Ward happily helped him, making him an agent in some way.16 This is because Ward introduced the Russian to Astor and Profumo, as well as many other high-ranking officials. Ward also willingly told Ivanov about guests at Cliveden and supplied him material about MPs, the government and the royal family (Ward painted several members of the royal family and said he’d socialised with Prince Philip). It was also Ward, Ivanov says, who told him when Profumo was out of town with Keeler, giving Ivanov the opportunity to visit his home and wife, and smuggle his spy camera into the minister’s study.
One example of Ward being happy to help Ivanov with gathering information given in the book is an instance where Ward used a portrait sitting to ask his well-connected subject about the deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany. Ward had been commissioned by the London Illustrated News to sketch US Ambassador David Bruce. Bruce and Ward remained friends after the portrait and at what Ivanov considered the height of the Berlin Crisis, Ward managed to get Bruce to confirm the US would not allow Germany to control nuclear or chemical weapons.17
With this in mind, Ivanov says that the Denning Report that concluded Ward’s connection with the Russian did not threaten national security was wrong. But he also adds that Ward was not working for anyone, instead that he had his own idiocentric set of rules that were impossible for others to comprehend. Ivanov paints Ward as a tragic figure, a man disillusioned by life, whose death was his third attempt at suicide. Ivanov felt that while Ward seemed popular, he had no real friends, that he lacked a cause and passion, and because of this, lacked strength, hope and confidence. Ivanov also feels that when Ward really needed help, there was nobody there for him.18
Ivanov also backs up Ward’s long-standing claim MI5 did contact him, saying that Ward showed him a yellow piece of paper that was an MOD pass with meeting details on it. Ward told Ivanov that MI5 had invited him to come in and talk to them and that they had questioned him about Ivanov.19
Davenport-Hines suggests that not only was Ward not a spy, but he had instead eagerly volunteered his services to our own government as a go-between with the Russians via Ivanov – and been rejected. As early as August 1961, during the ‘Berlin Crisis’, Ward had hoped to mediate between Russia and Britain. He persuaded Astor to write to the Foreign Office (FO), offering his services to relay messages to his Russian friend. When he was turned down, Ward instead introduced Ivanov to Sir Geoffrey Nicholson. Nicholson wrote Ivanov three letters discussing the matter, two of which were passed via Ward, and these were approved by the FO. Later Nicholson arranged lunch between Ward and Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Sir Harold Caccia. Caccia refused Ward’s offer of help, however.20
Davenport-Hines says Ward and Ivanov encouraged Tory backbencher Sir Godfrey Nicholson to arrange a meeting between Ward and Sir Harold Caccia in April 1962 too but that Ward’s offer to act as an intermediary was again declined.21 In an attempt to get to the ears of Macmillan at this time, Astor arranged for Ward to call and meet with the Earl of Arran. Ward also wanted Ivanov to attend the arranged visit to Arran’s home. After the meeting, Arran sent a summary of what had been discussed to Macmillan. Before anything could come of Ivanov and Ward’s various meetings, however, Russia had agreed to dismantle and withdraw its missiles from Cuba.22
MI5 files released in October 2022 and held in the National Archives bear out the role Ward played in Soviet/British relations during the Berlin Crisis. The files say that Ivanov was given ‘unofficial answers’ to his questions about the government’s policy on disarmament, Berlin and the Oder-Neisse line that divided Poland and Germany ‘in the form of letters signed by Sir Godfrey Nicholson, MO, and dated respectively 28 February, 8 March and 14 March 1962’.23 MI5 therefore knew that Ward was involved in legitimate diplomatic discussions but chose not to come forward to disclose this at any point during his criminal investigation and trial.
The memoirs of former spy Peter Wright, Spycatcher, released in 1987, identified Sir Roger Hollis as a Russian spy. Hollis was Director General of MI5 when Wagstaffe (known as Woods to Ward) was charged with interviewing Ward and monitoring his relationship with Ivanov. Hollis died in 1972, and despite being investigated four times was never identified as a spy.24 It was Hollis that established early on in his investigations that while Profumo might be having an extra-marital affair with Keeler, his private life was of no concern to the Security Service, and that the war minister presented no security risk, despite the social circles he was moving in, including that of Ward and Ivanov.
If Ward was not a direct and deliberate Soviet agent, was he then perhaps being very subtly used by those on the fringes of the affair? And does this explain why Keeler, when trying to piece together what she knew, concluded that he was a traitor?
Part IV
The Curtain Falls
Chapter 18
The Denning Report – Profumo’s Fault but It’s Ward that’s Wicked
When Profumo resigned, Harold Macmillan asked Lord Alfred Denning to undertake an enquiry. The senior judge was tasked with examining the circumstances that led to the resignation of the Secretary of State for War, and in particular, report on any threat to national security.
When the report was published by the Government Stationery Office on 26 September, it sold over 100,000 copies in a few days.1 Far from being a dull, dry report (despite its official title: ‘The Circumstances Leading to the Resignation of the Former Secretary of State for War, Mr J. D. Profumo’) it was described at the time as ‘the raciest and most readable blue book ever published’.2 Lines formed outside the Stationery Office with people wanting to pay 7s 6d for their copy. If there was muck to be raked, surely Denning must have found it? As early as 2 August, Denning told Macmillan he had established Ernest Maples, the Minister for Transport, had used prostitutes, while MP Denzil Freeth, deputy at the Ministry of Science, had been engaged in a homosexual relationship.3
Mandy Rice-Davies was one of the people interviewed by Denning. She received her summons when she had headed to the airport and a woman delivering a letter from Lord Denning stopped her. When she attended the interview, which was arranged for her return, Rice-Davies said she found the lord intimidating and that his mind was already made up about the case. Of the report, she remembers that the public queued from midnight to be the first to read it that September. However, she said that so much of it was wrong that it was instead colloquially known as the ‘Whitewash Paper’.4
Denning, who liked to keep a copy of the Bible close to hand when he was writing judgements,5 exonerated both the PM and the security services in his report, while he treated Keeler with some sympathy. The real criticism was reserved for Ward, however, who Denning believed to be immoral and evil. Even twenty years later, Denning hadn’t changed his mind about Ward, describing the osteopath as ‘really wicked’, ‘filthy’ and ‘steeped in vice’. It’s also been suggested that friends of Ward offered to testify, but Denning called none of them.
Keeler also considered the Denning Inquiry, which started on 25 June, to be part of the whitewash.6 She describes her experience of being interviewed twice in the government offices near Leicester Square. During these interviews, in wood-panelled rooms, Keeler says she told Denning everything she knew. She described visits by Hollis and Blunt, and what she knew about Sir Godfrey meeting Ivanov. She also identified Hollis and Sir Godfrey from photographs to ensure it hadn’t been a case of mistaken identity.
Keeler says Denning also interviewed Ward three times and spoke to Profumo, the PM, the press and to half a dozen girls that knew Ward, and had gathered reports from the police, MI5 and the CIA. Denning heard all the evidence in private.
In the interviews, Keeler says she confessed to Denning her part in the spy ring, that she’d witnessed meetings and taken sensitive material to the Russian Embassy. For her part, she believes she made it clear that Ward was an important player in Russian espionage, and that he’d tried to kill her because she knew so much. She also says she told Denning that Ward had described John Kennedy as ‘too dangerous’ and that he should be ‘put out of the picture’ a few months before his assignation.
By the end of her experience with Denning, however, Keeler felt what she had said had been ignored and that she was painted as a liar in order that Denning could claim there had been no risk to national security.7 This was done, she thought, in the national interest. Keeler feels that details of sex parties, such as the infamous Feast of Peacocks and the mysterious identity of the participant dubbed the ‘Man in the Mask’, were divulged to pull focus from any talk of spies in high places.
