Fabius, also, immediately ordered a large levy of troops to be made. His second

in command, called his master of horse, was directed to make this levy, and to assemble the troops at a place called Tibur, a few miles east of the city. There was always a master of horse appointed to attend upon and second a dictator.

The name of this officer in the case of Fabius was Minucius. Minucius was as ardent, prompt, and impetuous, as Fabius was cool, prudent, and calculating. He

levied the troops and brought them to their place of rendezvous. Fabius went out to take the command of them. One of the consuls was coming to join him, with a

body of troops which he had under his command. Fabius sent word to him that

he must come without any of the insignia of his authority, as all his authority, semi-regal as it was in ordinary times, was superseded and overruled in the presence of a dictator. A consul was accustomed to move in great state on all occasions. He was preceded by twelve men, bearing badges and insignia, to impress the army and the people with a sense of the greatness of his dignity. To see, therefore, a consul divested of all these marks of his power, and coming into the dictator's presence as any other officer would come before an acknowledged

superior, made the army of Fabius feel a very strong sense of the greatness of their new commander's dignity and power.

Proclamation of Fabius.

Fabius then issued a proclamation, which he sent by proper messengers into all

the region of country around Rome, especially to that part toward the territory which was in possession of Hannibal. In this proclamation he ordered all the people to abandon the country and the towns which were not strongly fortified,

and to seek shelter in the castles, and forts, and fortified cities. They were commanded, also, to lay waste the country which they should leave, and destroy

all the property, and especially all the provisions, which they could not take to their places of refuge. This being done, Fabius placed himself at the head of the

forces which he had got together, and moved on, cautiously and with great circumspection, in search of his enemy.

Progress of Hannibal.

In the mean time, Hannibal had crossed over to the eastern side of Italy, and had passed down, conquering and ravaging the country as he went, until he got considerably south of Rome. He seems to have thought it not quite prudent to advance to the actual attack of the city, after the battle of Lake Thrasymene; for the vast population of Rome was sufficient, if rendered desperate by his actually threatening the capture and pillage of the city, to overwhelm his army entirely.

So he moved to the eastward, and advanced on that side until he had passed the

city, and thus it happened that Fabius had to march to the southward and eastward in order to meet him. The two armies came in sight of each other quite

on the eastern side of Italy, very near the shores of the Adriatic Sea.

Policy of Fabius.

He declines fighting.

The policy which Fabius resolved to adopt was, not to give Hannibal battle, but

to watch him, and wear his army out by fatigue and delays. He kept, therefore,

near him, but always posted his army on advantageous ground, which all the defiance and provocations of Hannibal could not induce him to leave. When Hannibal moved, which he was soon compelled to do to procure provisions, Fabius would move too, but only to post and intrench himself in some place of

security as before. Hannibal did every thing in his power to bring Fabius to battle, but all his efforts were unavailing.

Hannibal's danger.

Stratagem of the fiery oxen.

In fact, he himself was at one time in imminent danger. He had got drawn, by Fabius's good management, into a place where he was surrounded by mountains,

upon which Fabius had posted his troops, and there was only one defile which offered any egress, and this, too, Fabius had strongly guarded. Hannibal resorted to his usual resource, cunning and stratagem, for means of escape. He collected a herd of oxen. He tied fagots across their horns, filling the fagots with pitch, so as to make them highly combustible. In the night on which he was going to attempt

to pass the defile, he ordered his army to be ready to march through, and then had the oxen driven up the hills around on the further side of the Roman

detachment which was guarding the pass. The fagots were then lighted on the horns of the oxen. They ran about, frightened and infuriated by the fire, which burned their horns to the quick, and blinded them with the sparks which fell from it. The leaves and branches of the forests were set on fire. A great commotion was thus made, and the guards, seeing the moving lights and hearing

the tumult, supposed that the Carthaginian army were upon the heights, and were

coming down to attack them. They turned out in great hurry and confusion to meet the imaginary foe, leaving the pass unguarded, and, while they were pursuing the bonfires on the oxens' heads into all sorts of dangerous and impracticable places, Hannibal quietly marched his army through the defile and

reached a place of safety.

Unpopularity of Fabius.

Although Fabius kept Hannibal employed and prevented his approaching the city, still there soon began to be felt a considerable degree of dissatisfaction that he did not act more decidedly. Minucius was continually urging him to give Hannibal battle, and, not being able to induce him to do so, he was continually

expressing his discontent and displeasure. The army sympathized with Minucius.

He wrote home to Rome too, complaining bitterly of the dictator's inefficiency.

Hannibal learned all this by means of his spies, and other sources of information, which so good a contriver as he has always at command. Hannibal was, of course, very much pleased to hear of these dissensions, and of the unpopularity

of Fabius. He considered such an enemy as he—so prudent, cautious, and watchful—as a far more dangerous foe than such bold and impetuous

commanders as Flaminius and Minucius, whom he could always entice into difficulty, and then easily conquer.

Hannibal's sagacity.

Hannibal thought he would render Minucius a little help in making Fabius unpopular. He found out from some Roman deserters that the dictator possessed

a valuable farm in the country, and he sent a detachment of his troops there, with orders to plunder and destroy the property all around it, but to leave the farm of Fabius untouched and in safety. The object was to give to the enemies of Fabius

at Rome occasion to say that there was secretly a good understanding between him and Hannibal, and that he was kept back from acting boldly in defense of his country by some corrupt bargain which he had traitorously made with the enemy.

Plots against Fabius.

These plans succeeded. Discontent and dissatisfaction spread rapidly, both in the camp and in the city. At Rome they made an urgent demand upon Fabius to return, ostensibly because they wished him to take part in some great religious ceremonies, but really to remove him from the camp, and give Minucius an opportunity to attack Hannibal. They also wished to devise some method, if possible, of depriving him of his power. He had been appointed for six months,

and the time had not yet nearly expired: but they wished to shorten, or, if they could not shorten, to limit and diminish his power.

He goes to Rome.

Minucius risks a battle.

Fabius went to Rome, leaving the army under the orders of Minucius, but commanding him positively not to give Hannibal battle, nor expose his troops to