The policy which Fabius resolved to adopt was, not to give Hannibal battle, but
to watch him, and wear his army out by fatigue and delays. He kept, therefore,
near him, but always posted his army on advantageous ground, which all the defiance and provocations of Hannibal could not induce him to leave. When Hannibal moved, which he was soon compelled to do to procure provisions, Fabius would move too, but only to post and intrench himself in some place of
security as before. Hannibal did every thing in his power to bring Fabius to battle, but all his efforts were unavailing.
Hannibal's danger.
Stratagem of the fiery oxen.
In fact, he himself was at one time in imminent danger. He had got drawn, by Fabius's good management, into a place where he was surrounded by mountains,
upon which Fabius had posted his troops, and there was only one defile which offered any egress, and this, too, Fabius had strongly guarded. Hannibal resorted to his usual resource, cunning and stratagem, for means of escape. He collected a herd of oxen. He tied fagots across their horns, filling the fagots with pitch, so as to make them highly combustible. In the night on which he was going to attempt
to pass the defile, he ordered his army to be ready to march through, and then had the oxen driven up the hills around on the further side of the Roman
detachment which was guarding the pass. The fagots were then lighted on the horns of the oxen. They ran about, frightened and infuriated by the fire, which burned their horns to the quick, and blinded them with the sparks which fell from it. The leaves and branches of the forests were set on fire. A great commotion was thus made, and the guards, seeing the moving lights and hearing
the tumult, supposed that the Carthaginian army were upon the heights, and were
coming down to attack them. They turned out in great hurry and confusion to meet the imaginary foe, leaving the pass unguarded, and, while they were pursuing the bonfires on the oxens' heads into all sorts of dangerous and impracticable places, Hannibal quietly marched his army through the defile and
reached a place of safety.
Unpopularity of Fabius.
Although Fabius kept Hannibal employed and prevented his approaching the city, still there soon began to be felt a considerable degree of dissatisfaction that he did not act more decidedly. Minucius was continually urging him to give Hannibal battle, and, not being able to induce him to do so, he was continually
expressing his discontent and displeasure. The army sympathized with Minucius.
He wrote home to Rome too, complaining bitterly of the dictator's inefficiency.
Hannibal learned all this by means of his spies, and other sources of information, which so good a contriver as he has always at command. Hannibal was, of course, very much pleased to hear of these dissensions, and of the unpopularity
of Fabius. He considered such an enemy as he—so prudent, cautious, and watchful—as a far more dangerous foe than such bold and impetuous
commanders as Flaminius and Minucius, whom he could always entice into difficulty, and then easily conquer.
Hannibal's sagacity.
Hannibal thought he would render Minucius a little help in making Fabius unpopular. He found out from some Roman deserters that the dictator possessed
a valuable farm in the country, and he sent a detachment of his troops there, with orders to plunder and destroy the property all around it, but to leave the farm of Fabius untouched and in safety. The object was to give to the enemies of Fabius
at Rome occasion to say that there was secretly a good understanding between him and Hannibal, and that he was kept back from acting boldly in defense of his country by some corrupt bargain which he had traitorously made with the enemy.
Plots against Fabius.
These plans succeeded. Discontent and dissatisfaction spread rapidly, both in the camp and in the city. At Rome they made an urgent demand upon Fabius to return, ostensibly because they wished him to take part in some great religious ceremonies, but really to remove him from the camp, and give Minucius an opportunity to attack Hannibal. They also wished to devise some method, if possible, of depriving him of his power. He had been appointed for six months,
and the time had not yet nearly expired: but they wished to shorten, or, if they could not shorten, to limit and diminish his power.
He goes to Rome.
Minucius risks a battle.
Fabius went to Rome, leaving the army under the orders of Minucius, but commanding him positively not to give Hannibal battle, nor expose his troops to
any danger, but to pursue steadily the same policy which he himself had followed. He had, however, been in Rome only a short time before tidings came
that Minucius had fought a battle and gained a victory. There were boastful and
ostentatious letters from Minucius to the Roman senate, lauding the exploit which he had performed.
Speech of Fabius.
Fabius examined carefully the accounts. He compared one thing with another, and satisfied himself of what afterward proved to be the truth, that Minucius had gained no victory at all. He had lost five or six thousand men, and Hannibal had lost no more, and Fabius showed that no advantage had been gained. He urged
upon the senate the importance of adhering to the line of policy he had pursued, and the danger of risking every thing, as Minucius had done, on the fortunes of a single battle. Besides, he said, Minucius had disobeyed his orders, which were distinct and positive, and he deserved to be recalled.
In saying these things Fabius irritated and exasperated his enemies more than ever. "Here is a man," said they, "who will not only not fight the enemies whom he is sent against himself, but he will not allow any body else to fight them.
Even at this distance, when his second in command has obtained a victory, he will not admit it, and endeavors to curtail the advantages of it. He wishes to protract the war, that he may the longer continue to enjoy the supreme and unlimited authority with which we have intrusted him."
Fabius returns to the army.
He is deprived of the supreme power.
