True.
Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other than the others, in repeating the word 'other' we speak of that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?
Quite true.
Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than the one, in that the word 'other' is applied to both, will be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition is like?
Yes.
Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other than every thing.
True.
Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?
Yes.
And the other to the same?
True again.
And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?
Yes.
And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others?
Certainly.
And in that it was other it was shown to be like?
Yes.
But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite affection to that which made it like; and this was the affection of otherness.
Yes.
The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the opposite of the other.
True.
Then the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far as it is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.
Yes, that argument may be used.
And there is another argument.
What?
In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected otherwise, and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is like; but in so far as it is affected by other it is otherwise, and being otherwise affected is unlike.
True.
Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like and unlike the others?
Certainly.
And in the same way as being other than itself and the same with itself, on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike itself?
Of course.
Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others?—consider.
I am considering.
The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?
True.
And also in other things?
Yes.
In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching them, and would touch itself only.
Clearly.
Then the inference is that it would touch both?
