Certainly.
For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself or the others.
Certainly.
But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?
Of course it must.
Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become?
Certainly.
And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?
True.
And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?
Quite right.
Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed, and everything of this kind which appertains to other things appertains to the one.
Certainly, that is true.
Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is both one and many, as we have described, and is neither one nor many, and participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake of being?
Certainly.
But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being?
Impossible.
Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same.
True.
And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes being—for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives and also gives it up at some time?
Impossible.
And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?
I should.
And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?
I should.
The one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking and giving up being.
Certainly.
And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one?
Certainly.
And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience separation and aggregation?
Inevitably.
And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated?
Yes.
And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalized?
True.
And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all?
How can it?
But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without experiencing change, is impossible.
Impossible.
And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest?
