“With the retirement of a number of the B-52s three years ago, and the F-111s last year, we have very limited long-range bombing capabilities. There are about thirty B-52s that are combat ready. We do have two squadrons of long range B-1 bombers on the west coast and a couple of squadrons of B-2s that can take off from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, refuel in Hawaii, refuel again by air over Japan if we can get tankers airborne ahead of them out of Hawaii, but it will be tough. Only about 30 of the B-1Bs and sixteen of the B-2s are combat ready. Without any land base anywhere except Guam, we are hurting. I’ll bet right now both the Koreans and the Japanese are wishing that they hadn’t thrown us out. We sure could use Okinawa. Ditto the Philippines. Without land bases, we might be able to fly no more than a squadron-sized strike every twenty-four hours due to lack of refueling capabilities. Diego Garcia has limited capabilities in this regard. Perhaps as important is the fact that the British own Diego Garcia. With their current anti-American Labor Government, I don’t know what to expect. We have to have their permission before we can utilize the base there in time of war, even though we built it. They don’t store a heck of a lot of JP-8 fuel for our aircraft, at least not in terms of extended combat operations. Perhaps enough for two weeks of round the clock combat. If we start hauling aircraft fuel to the Navy’s carriers, we might be able to conduct a dozen or so strikes before we run the well dry. The last administration regarded our renting modified 767s from Boeing for use as tankers as a sweetheart deal for Boeing. With the cancellation of the contract, we lack any strategic depth in aerial refueling.”

“Why are so few of these bombers combat ready, General?”

“Sir, the last administration raided the OPM, the Operational and Maintenance, funds for other purposes so that we don’t have enough spare parts for one hundred percent maintenance. We cannibalize the down aircraft as necessary to keep the others in the air.”

“Marge, go upstairs and get on the horn with first the Japanese, then the Filipinos. Find out if they will let us reopen our old bases there and use them as refueling and maintenance bases. Then call the Brits and see if they will permit us to use Diego Garcia. How long, Admiral Stark, will it take to get those bases operational, using your Sea Bees?”

“To be honest, Mr. President, I don’t know. It will depend upon their condition and how much of a security problem we will have. The Islamic extremists will most certainly regard this as a bonanza of a target in the Philippines. Okinawa, maybe three weeks to a month, depending on how fast we can get the Japanese out of there, our own people in, and get to work. We can use Guam as an intermediate staging area. We can get a couple of tankers started in that direction, but we won’t know the status of the pipelines, storage tanks, valves, and so on until we inspect them. Lastly, the Navy is down to three battalions of Sea Bees. We’re strapped for manpower.”

“What about this Mobile Offshore Base ship or concept that was in the news last year? Where do we stand on it?”

“There is a lot of confusion and public misconception over that, Mr. President. Funds were allotted only for proof of concept. Construction really hasn’t begun. It is a hundred-billion-dollar deal, and Congress wanted absolute proof before they voted funds to build a floating island you could land a C-130H on. No support ships, let alone the main landing ship, have been funded nor construction initiated.”

“Admiral, order that carrier battle group with the Marine Expeditionary Brigade to stand by off Pusan. If we go in, we must have that port. We will need the Marines there. We will hold Pusan regardless of the cost.”

“Mr. President, I should point out that it appears that the North Koreans launched an amphibious assault in the Yellow Sea, and we think their objective is the port of Inchon. It doesn’t seem to be a large invasion force at this time, perhaps a division or so in size, but it could cause us trouble. It does present a target for consideration for this carrier battle group. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade can continue on to guard Pusan if you so order.”

The President pondered for a moment, then said, “Good suggestion, Admiral, but I deem Pusan more important. I want that carrier air arm and naval gunfire in complete support of the Marines if we go. Pusan is of the most strategic value right now, at least until we get further information about the situation on the ground.”

The Admiral picked up the red phone in front of him and gave the order. “Pusan is the objective of the Carrier Battle Group III and the Marine Expeditionary Brigade accompanying it.”

The President spoke. “A little while ago, I heard an interesting theory from one of Secretary Talbot’s people. She believes the Chinese are orchestrating this and that it is only the opening move of a series of thrusts that will ultimately be made by the Chinese. She thinks China will strike south and west. India would be the logical target of the western thrust, and she didn’t express an opinion on the objective of the southern thrust. What do you gentlemen think China’s role is in this? General Leonard?”

“Mr. President, my Marines and I think it is entirely plausible. Our folks have never felt comfortable with China since the early 1930s.” General Craig and several of the others smiled at Mark Leonard’s homily.

“What, General, do your folks think?”

“Well, Mr. President, my intelligence people think that the real objective of China might be Caspian Sea oil. The Korean peninsula, maybe even Taiwan, and less likely India or Vietnam, could be strategic feints. Rather like the Japanese attempt to draw us off to Alaska and then take Midway, only on a far grander scale. Who knows, maybe they want it all. Certainly, they intend to bring Taiwan into the fold, sooner or later, one way or another, peaceably or by force. It could be that the Korean peninsula is a way of tying us down while they make a major move.”

“General Anderson, what’s your opinion, comments, recommendations?”

“Mr. President, we have, as you know, ten active divisions, and ten now in reserve. Those reserve divisions are not up to snuff. We are prepared to fight a limited war, but nothing like the massive capabilities of the Chinese should they enter the foray. We can have all the information we want, but without the firepower necessary to do them, we can only watch them on satellite computer screens. In order to meet any kind of mass the Chinese are capable of fielding, we would have to go nuclear.”

“Well, what about the peninsula?”

“We lack the strategic airlift to get there in any kind of timely fashion, Mr. President. It takes 600 to 750 sorties with C-17s and C-5As to get an entire heavy division into the battle. We will have to move by sealift. That will take several weeks. So, it boils down to how fast South Korea is overrun, whether or not the South can hold out until the cavalry arrives, and if enough of it arrives in time.”

“Admiral, what is the threat at sea? I don’t believe the North has any kind of a Navy that can threaten our sealift, do they?”

“Our concern in that area, Mr. President, is the submarine threat, and we believe it is substantial. We will be operating close to the mainland, well within range of the latest, state of the art diesel submarine fleet in the world. We know the North Koreans have purchased several Kilo 636s from the Russians. We also believe, but have no firm evidence, that they might have acquired several more from China. We know that the Swedes, Germans, and French have sold them the latest in diesel submarine engines and technology, sonar and detection gear, guidance systems for torpedoes and so on. We now have three Virginia class submarines as our first line submarine fleet. We have twenty-five of the Los Angeles class submarines still in service, and those platforms are all thirty-five years old or older. They are noisier, however, and not as well equipped as we believe the submarines the North Koreans have purchased are.”

“You mean to tell me, Admiral, that we are behind some lousy third-rate lunatic dictator in submarine capability?”

“Yes, Mr. President, in the littoral or brown water environment, their submarine capability exceeds ours. I would not be surprised to lose a number of our Los Angeles class nuclear attack submarines to theirs in an undersea battle. Our surface anti-submarine research has lagged for over a decade due to under funding. Our anti-submarine capabilities have atrophied over the last twenty years due to lack of funding. Our antisubmarine warfare assets are in worse shape than our submarine fleet. We might have a difficult time detecting them with air or surface assets. We have been trying to ferret them out in the Yellow Sea to record their individual characteristics, but more often than not, they give us the slip or show up tracking us without our knowledge until they are well within kill parameters. We can’t seem to track them very well with the Los Angeles class boats. We found in war gaming in the late 1990s and the early years of this century that the latest diesel-powered boats were more than a match for our Los Angeles class boats, especially in the littoral environment. In point of fact, a Chilean submarine escaped our detection in 1996. A Russian Oscar submarine trailed our USS Coronado without detection for two days in 1997. Australian submarines penetrated our best defense efforts during the war game RIMPAC 2000. Since then, our antisubmarine warfare capability and submarine fleet have deteriorated even more.

“Now, our new Virginia class submarines are a different story. They were designed and built for littoral operations. We can nail enemy submarines with those, but unfortunately, we only have three of them at this time. We were supposed to get one a year, but the previous administration saw no need for them and cancelled the contracts. One of them is in the North Atlantic, the other two in the Arabian Sea. You will recall our Sea Wolf submarine program was cancelled late in the last century. That was a superb, multi-mission, do everything, super stealthy submarine that was deemed too expensive. Now, we could use about 50 of them.”

“Well, just how many submarines do you think they have, Admiral?”

“Our estimates vary widely, Mr. President. Our best guess is that they have about thirty in total. There might be more to this story, however, Mr. President.”

“You mean more good submarine news, Admiral?”

“Mr. President, a major concern has been the People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN, of China. In 2004, they began purchasing a variety of the latest diesel submarine technology from the Germans, French and Swedes and tested them. They contracted in 2007 with the Germans for their technology under license. The Germans sent hundreds of technicians and engineers to China to teach them how to build their latest model. We have unconfirmed reports of a massive submarine construction program ongoing in China. We really don’t know for sure, but some intelligence sources indicate they have been building five to ten boats a year for the last several years in different shipyards. These ships have a variety of state-of-the-art weapons systems and stealth technology. They can accurately shoot cruise missiles without having to surface. In fact, they can shoot from significant depths. If China supports North Korea with submarine forces in the Straits of Taiwan or the Yellow Sea or the South China Sea, we could have very grave problems.

“We have been in communication with our Joint Task Force, JTF-519. The Commander of this JTF is also the Pacific Fleet Commander. The Pacific Fleet has five carrier battle groups assigned to it. We retired a sixth two years ago. Two of the five Pacific Fleet’s carrier groups are on the west coast for refueling and refitting. Many members of their crews are scattered across on the country, on extended leave. They will be of little immediate assistance. The carriers are undergoing nuclear fuel rod exchange that takes weeks to months. The Commander of the JTF has ordered all ships under his command, that is all the ships in the Pacific Theater, to steam towards Korea.

“The Central Command Naval Commander is holding steady in his positions in the Arabian Sea awaiting orders.”

“All right, back to the immediate business of the Korean peninsula. What is our formal game plan, and when was it last updated, General Craig?”

“Our last update was three years ago. The previous administration decided we would not honor our agreement of coming to the aid of South Korea because they threw us out. Without the tripwire force there to create a strong emotional reaction, he felt that there was no way the American people would support another war in Asia. When we left, we left them fifty tactical nuclear warheads, mostly in the one quarter kiloton to ten kiloton range. We believe the South has produced several of their own that are larger than that. Additionally, the South Koreans have purchased intermediate range rockets from the Japanese and built some short-range rockets of their own, all capable of delivery of warheads in this size range. In short, Mr. President, we have left the South Koreans out there by themselves. Of course, they brought it on themselves. Our treaty with them is worthless, and both we and they know it.”

“Well, I wonder what the United Nations has to say about this attack. Johnny, call our ambassador in New York City and get some feedback. This has been underway now for some hours, and surely the UN has started their ball rolling. I wonder why Dick Griffith hasn’t checked in with us. See what you can find out. I’m going back upstairs. General Craig, give me a routine report every four hours via a messenger on how it is going unless something really significant happens, like mushroom clouds. Secretaries, we will meet again here with the Chiefs at 14:00 hours. Marge, see me in my office for a few minutes. Oh, one more thing, in addition to the Presidential Daily Brief, I want this group to meet every Monday, Wednesday and Friday mornings for breakfast at 07:00 until further notice. The brain power here is far more synergistic than individually. OK, Marge, let’s you and I go back upstairs, and everybody else, back to the grind.”

Back in the Oval Office, Jason Thornton plopped in his chair and bit his lip. “Marge, I’m a bit troubled about Roberta Stearns’s theory. I wonder if the North Koreans would dare do anything without the permission of China. Call the Chinese ambassador, let’s keep it low-key today, but try and find out what they think, what they are doing about this. Have a report ready at 14:00 hours for all of us.”

“Yes, Mr. President. I’ll call their ambassador immediately.” With that, she nodded and left the Oval Office.

Jason Thornton picked up the phone and punched the number to the war room. An aide answered. “Let me speak to General Craig, or better still, put me on the speaker,” said Thornton. “Gentlemen, I want you to keep an eye on any indicator of mobilization by the Chinese. Anything at all that looks suspicious let me know. Call our folks there and see if there is any indication of any kind of mobilization.”

“This is General Craig, Mr. President. We will contact you as soon as there is any indication of anything at all. We have people in several cities, and we will contact them. We will also monitor via satellite.”

“Thanks, General. Talk to you later.” Jason Thornton hung up his phone, leaned back in his chair and thought of the consequences of Chinese involvement.

Johnny Withers looked into the Oval Office to see his boss lost in space. He knocked on the doorframe to announce his presence. “Mr. President, The Assistant Secretary of Defense is here with a Colonel Burgess from Fort Detrick.”

“Bring them in, Johnny.”

“Yes sir. Gentlemen, this way if you please.” He ushered the two into the oval office.

“Mr. President, this is Colonel Frank Burgess, Medical Corps, and Commander of our DOD Medical Intelligence Unit at Fort Detrick. You asked for him to come a couple of hours ago.”

“Yes, please have a seat, gentlemen. I am particularly interested, Colonel, in the possibility of a biological attack on the United States by the People’s Republic of Korea. What can you tell me about North Korea’s capabilities for such an attack?”

“Frankly, Mr. President, they are extremely good. North Korea has quite an offensive biological weapons program from what we can gather. A defector two years ago made it to South Korea, where we had the opportunity to interview him on a number of occasions. The North Koreans have weaponized a number of biological agents. This guy was really a virologist, working on some novel viruses; actually, he was especially involved with genetically engineering an influenza virus to make it resistant to the two antibiotics amantidine and rimantidine. He said he was quite successful in enhancing both its virulence and pathogenicity. He is aware that they also have genetically engineered a number of other agents, including anthrax and tularemia and a couple of others, but he has no details of them. Each section was very exclusive, and no contact was supposed to occur between working groups working on the different organisms.”

“Colonel, you used two terms, virulent and patho- something. What do those mean?”

“Mr. President, virulence refers to the severity of the disease caused by an organism. Pathogenicity refers to its ability to cause disease without reference as to the severity of the disease. Pathogenicity implies, but doesn’t specifically state, a high degree of transmissibility.”

“In other words, Colonel, he was working to engineer an influenza virus that caused a lot of severe sickness and was highly contagious?”

“Precisely, Mr. President. He indicated that they hadn’t field tested it yet, but they did try it on a number of political prisoners. He said the case fatality ratio, that’s the number dead over the number ill, was quite high, in the neighborhood of sixty to seventy percent.”

“You mean they tested this on people?”