remedy that Lenin and his comrades of ered to deal with this natural evil was not devoid of logic. If nationalist feelings were surfacing all 115

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over the world anyway, let these sentiments l ourish and exhaust themselves on their own instead of i ghting budding nations and nationalities, which would only make things worse. Let them enjoy their folk cultures and languages, and give them their own indigenous bosses to make people happy. h e early Bolsheviks assumed that such lenient attitudes to nationalism would surely help to merge humans into a global cosmopolitan commonwealth—which they assumed was the natural direction the whole world was moving toward. In the 1920s, Joseph Stalin declared, “We are undertaking the maximum development of national culture, so that it will exhaust itself completely and thereby create the base for the organization of international socialist culture.” 20

Ironically, as early as 1917 this would-be dictator, who would preside over one of the most brutal dictatorships in history, was put in charge of the National Commissariat for Nationalities Af airs, a special bureaucratic structure created by the Bolsheviks to draw non-Russians to their side.

In this nationalities scheme of the early Bolsheviks, the Russian population, which was held responsible for the sins of the old tsarist empire, was expected to humble itself and make room for non-Russians to even the social playing i eld. Formerly disadvantaged nationalities were to receive resources and more participation in Communist bureaucracy, government, and education. Simultaneously, in order to empower the less fortunate ones, Marxist historians began to rewrite history, turning indigenous historical characters into heroes, while their Russian counterparts were recast as villains. h at is how the famous Bolshevik

“ai rmative-action empire” was born. Besides the noble goal of making all nationalities equal, courting local nationalist sentiments was a very handy tool of control. Essentially, it boiled down to the good old principle, divide and rule. h is explains why in the 1920s the Bolsheviks tried to create a number of autonomies with their own languages, cultures, and Communist elites. Even miniscule tribes of hunters and gatherers in Siberia, some numbering less than two thousand people, were entitled to their schools, languages, and indigenous bureaucrats.

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In the 1920s, the Buryat, Kalmyk, Tuvans, Oirot, Mongols and many other groups received their own autonomies under supervision of the Bolsheviks. In 1921, Red Russia recognized the sovereignty of Mongolia, which formally was still considered part of China. h en in 1923

the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Republic was created in Siberia, thereby splitting the Buryat and Mongols apart and casting aside the pan-Mongol dream of building up a great state for all people of Mongol stock. Later, a similar tactic was applied to Tuva, which was made a separate state with its own written language and Bolshevik-friendly indigenous elite. 21 h e assumption was that it was safer to grant Tuva nationhood under Russian supervision than to merge it with Red Mongolia. Overall, the nationalities polices were one of the biggest coups of the Bolsheviks. Even though this strategy later backi red—in the early 1930s Stalin realized that nationalism did not want to exhaust itself, and therefore he had to wipe out indigenous elites and mute the ai rmative

action—in the 1920s, it did allow the Bolsheviks to draw non-Russian nationalities to their side.

Against the Grain: White Baron von Ungern-Sternberg h e success the early Bolsheviks enjoyed in hijacking ethnic and national sentiments becomes visible if contrasted with the failure of the pan-Asian project advocated by Baron von Ungern-Sternberg, a White general with occult leanings who briel y ruled Mongolia in 1920–21.

Too much has been written both in English and Russian about this colorful baron and his sadistic deeds for me to go over it again here. 22

What is more interesting to explore is why he was initially so stunning-ly successful in winning over Mongolia and then failed so miserably by losing it in a few months.

h e collapse of the imperial dynasty in Russia in 1917 and the advent of Communism was a personal tragedy for this psychotic Cossack platoon leader. His whole world was turned upside down. Like many of his Baltic German countrymen who were part of the old Russian imperial 117

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Figure 5.4. “Mad Baron” Roman von Ungern-Sternberg, an occultist and runaway White Russian warlord from Siberia who briel y took over Mongolia in 1920–21.

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elite, he felt uprooted, blaming international i nanciers, Jews, and Bolsheviks for all his troubles. From then on, Ungern would devote his life to eradicating this evil and to bringing monarchy back. For him, only kings and emperors were capable of providing order and stability. All other forms of government were unequivocally wicked and immoral.

In the beginning of the Civil War between Red Bolsheviks and White counterrevolutionaries, Ungern rose as a powerful warlord in the Far East, controlling a leg of the Trans-Siberian railroad. In charge of a wild bunch of over six hundred Russian and Buryat Cossacks, drit ers, and bandits, who tenderly called him Grandpa, Ungern robbed passing trains, murdered Bolsheviks, and sabotaged supply lines of White colleagues he considered too liberal. By the end of 1920, when his fortunes were at low ebb, Ungern was l eeing southward from the advancing Red army. Searching for a sanctuary, his hungry and freezing Asian Cavalry Division rolled into Mongolia. For him, this nomadic country was a Figure 5.5. Ragtag members of Ungern’s Asian Cavarly Division.

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natural choice: by this time, he had become totally disgusted with the corrupt West and had fallen in love with Asia: “I am i rmly convinced that the light comes from the East, where people are not yet spoiled by the West and where in a holy manner the foundations of goodness and honor, which were granted to us by Heaven, are still preserved untouched.” 23 Ungern dreamed that from the heart of Asia, uncorrupted by modern life, he would advance westward, restoring monarchies all over Eurasia, i rst in China, then in Russia, and i nally going farther to Central Europe.

In the meantime, taking advantage of the chaos caused by the 1917

Russian Revolution, Chinese warlord general Hsü Shu-cheng (Little Hsü) recaptured Mongolia, taking away the sovereignty the Mongols had enjoyed since 1913. In Urga, the Mongol capitol, Chinese troops drat ed from the dregs of society lived by marauding the local population. h e Bogdo-gegen, leader of Mongol Tibetan Buddhists, was put under house arrest and publicly humiliated, and religious festivals were disrupted. h e descendants of Genghis Khan came to hate the Chinese and were a gunpowder keg ready to explode. 24

Into this explosive world rode Ungern with his hungry and freezing gang, eager to seize Chinese food supplies and ammunition. Storming into Mongolia, Ungern pledged to liberate it from the Chinese, and at i rst nomads cheered him as a redeemer who, as if by magic, descended upon them from the north, captured Urga, and squashed the despised aliens. h e baron was pleased to observe how his cavalry unit became swollen with Mongol volunteers who l ocked to join him.

h e grateful Bogdo-gegen granted Ungern the title of Prince, and monks declared him a manifestation of Mahakala, one of the ferocious deities that protected the Buddhist faith. h e clerics also interpreted

Ungern’s victory over the Chinese as the fuli llment of the Shambhala prophecy. Later, at er the baron’s demise, the Bolsheviks uncovered among his personal papers a Russian translation of a Tibetan text containing the Shambhala prophecy. 25 Ungern, who was always interested in occult things, gladly embraced his role as a legendary redeemer, 120

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Figure 5.6. h e eighth Bogdo-gegen, leader of Mongol Tibetan Buddhists and head of the Mongol state from 1911 to 1924. Although considered a reincarnation of the great Tibetan scholar Taranatha, he was a heavy drinker and notorious womanizer, which seemed not to match his past life.

trying to act in an appropriate manner. He began wearing a long red-and-blue silk Mongol robe over his Russian oi cer uniform. In this outi t, with the Order of St. George received for his daring deeds during World War I and numerous Tibetan Buddhist amulets hanging on his chest, this descendant of Teutonic knights produced quite an impression on all who ran across him.

So Mongol independence was won. What was next? h at was when

the baron got into serious trouble and eventually lost the country. As it turned out, Ungern had nothing to of er the nomads, who wanted to see him not only as protector of the faith, but also as guardian of their national independence. First of all, the Mongols were greatly dismayed with the magnitude of the brutalities he committed. h is is not to say that his nomadic colleagues acted nobly: the Mongols could be 121

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quite ruthless and brutal to their enemies. Yet some of Ungern’s cruel-ties seemed too bizarre, excessive, and unnecessary; his nomadic allies could not understand why he punished his own oi cers by putting them on ice, burning them alive, or feeding them to wild beasts.

What especially puzzled the nomads was his pathological hatred of the “black Russians,” the Mongols’ expression for Jews. h ey could accept the massacre of some Chinese prisoners, enemies of their country and faith, but it was hard for them to rationalize the butchering of Jews, with whom the nomads never had any problems. h ere were not many of them in Urga anyway, no more than one hundred people, yet Ungern specially targeted all of them for annihilation. Before storming Urga, the baron gathered his oi cers and gave them an explicit order: “Upon taking Urga, all Jews should be destroyed, I mean slaughtered.” 26 Back in Europe, budding German national socialists inspired by Alfred Rosen-berg, a fellow Baltic German expatriate, would have certainly applauded these words. Yet such scapegoating customized exclusively for the Europeans who were eager to build up their anger and hatred did not make any sense on the vast plains of Mongolia. In hindsight, Ungern would have made a better “national socialist” case by milking Mongol dislike of local Chinese merchants and the Chinese in general. Still, despite this opportunity, the baron was hopelessly trapped in the web of his European phobias, which he was determined to live by in Mongolia. It was certainly not the type of behavior the local people expected from Mahakala. In fact, some of them began to question Ungern’s sanity.

However, this pathological anti-Semitism was not so much what alienated Ungern’s nomadic allies. What really upset them was the future he envisioned for Mongols. At er handing over power to the Bogdo-gegen, the baron began to pursue his most cherished dream—restoring monarchies. He would begin by resurrecting the Manchu dynasty that had controlled China along with Mongolia and Tibet for centuries before it was toppled by the 1911 revolution. h en he would proceed to Russia, bringing back the Romanovs’ dynasty, and farther into Central Europe, restoring the Hapsburgs and their German cousins. As his short-term 122

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goal, Ungern set out to build a vast pan-Asian empire under the Manchu dynasty that would unite all people of Mongol stock, from China to Kazakhstan and from Mongolia to Tibet. It was hard to imagine a more senseless act than asking the Mongols who had just won their independence from the Chinese to go back under the Manchu-Chinese yoke.

Although he had some knowledge of the Mongols’ culture, memo-rized several phrases in their language, and acquired at least a superi cial knowledge of Tibetan Buddhism, Ungern did not grasp a simple thing: the nomads were craving for independence. h ey were interested neither in building up a grand pan-Mongol state nor in restoring the Chinese Empire. Yet the eyes of the baron, with his medieval reverence for monarchies, remained blind. h e borders he drew were between monarchs and their subjects, not between ethnic groups and nations.

With his mind set in the glorious feudal past, Ungern could not comprehend what the Bolsheviks already grasped: the power of modern nationalism. h at is why he lost Mongolia. h e baron’s faith in the divine power of kings and his obsession with feudal order, knighthood, and honor put him in the traditionalist camp—a motley group of like-minded contemporary Europeans who lamented the bygone aristocratic legacy and looked toward the Orient for inspiration.

General M. G. Tornovsky, one of Ungern’s former oi cers, explained well why the Mongols gave up on Ungern so easily and switched to Red Russia: “h e world of Buddhism will not say a good word about General Ungern. He was not committed to the Mongol national cause, being involved in correspondence with Chinese generals and aristocrats, trying to plot something with them. h

e Mongols could not forgive this

and betrayed him. h ey realized that for General Ungern, Mongolia was not the goal but the tool to pursue his own goals, which were alien to the Mongols.” 27

Unaware that he was setting himself up for failure, Ungern wrote letters to various Mongol princes, chiefs of the Kazakhs in Soviet Central Asia, Moslems in western China, and even the Dalai Lama, asking them to join his grand enterprise of restoring the Chinese Middle 123

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