b) To BURGES BALL, Philadelphia, July 27, 1794.
“If you can keep him always with your people he will make you a good Overseer; and without it, neither he or any other man will. With me, it is an established maxim, that an Overseer shall never be absent from his people but at night, and at his meals.” [emphasis in the original]
V. MILITARY AND PATRIOTISM
A. Military
1. The Army’s Need of Food and Clothing
a) To PHILIP LIVINGSTON, ELBRIDGE GERRY AND GEORGE CLYMER, Camp at the Clove, July 19, 1777.
“It is a maxim, which needs no illustration, that nothing can be of more importance in an Army than the Cloathing and feeding it well; on these, the health, comfort, and Spirits of Soldiers essentially depend, and it is a melancholy fact, that the American Army are miserably defective in both these respects; the distress the most of them are in, for want of Cloathing, is painful to humanity, dispiriting to themselves, and discouraging to every Officer. It makes every pretension to the preservation of cleanliness impossible, exposes them to a variety of disorders, and abates, or destroys that Military pride, without which nothing can be expected from any Army.”
2. Military Strength
a) To THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS, Head Quarters, Camp near German Town, August 10, 1777.
“It is generally a well-founded Maxim, that we ought to endeavour to reduce our defence, as much as possible, to a certainty, by collecting our Strength and making all our preparations at one point, rather than to risk its being weak and ineffectual every where, by dividing our attention and force to different objects.”
3. Military Academy
a) EIGHTH ANNUAL ADDRESS TO CONGRESS,
December 7, 1796.
“The Institution of a Military Academy, is also recommended by cogent reasons. However pacific the general policy of a Nation may be, it ought never to be without an adequate stock of Military knowledge for emergencies. The first would impair the energy of its character, and both would hazard its safety, or expose it to greater evils when War could not be avoided. Besides that War, might often, not depend upon its own choice. In proportion, as the observance of pacific maxims, might exempt a Nation from the necessity of practising the rules of the Military Art, ought to be its care in preserving, and transmitting by proper establishments, the knowledge of that Art. Whatever argument may be drawn from particular examples, superficially viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince, that the Art of War, is at once comprehensive and complicated; that it demands much previous study; and that the possession of it, in its most improved and perfect state, is always of great moment to the security of a Nation. This, therefore, ought to be a serious care of every Government: and for this purpose, an Academy, where a regular course of Instruction is given, is an obvious expedient, which different Nations have successfully employed.”
4. Militia
a) To LUND WASHINGTON, Col. Morris’s, on the Heights of Harlem,
September 30, 1776.
“This time last year I pointed out the evil consequences of short enlistments, the expenses of militia, and the little dependence that was to be placed in them. I assured [Congress] that the longer they delayed raising a standing army, the more difficult and chargeable would they find it to get on and that, at the same time that the militia would answer no valuable purpose, the frequent calling them in would be attended with an expense, that they could have no conception of. Whether, as I have said before, the unfortunate hope of reconciliation was the cause, or the fear of a standing army prevailed, I will not undertake to say; but the policy was to engage men for twelve months only. The consequence of which, you have had great bodies of militia in pay that never were in camp; you have had immense quantities of provisions drawn by men that never rendered you one hour’s service (at least usefully), and this in the most profuse and wasteful way.… I am wearied to death all day with a variety of perplexing circumstances—disturbed at the conduct of the militia, whose behavior and want of discipline has done great injury to the other troops, who never had officers, except in a few instances, worth the bread they eat.”
b) To JOHN AUGUSTINE WASHINGTON, February 24, 1777.
“Militia, . . . here today and gone tomorrow—whose way, like the ways of Providence are almost inscrutable.”
5. Bunker Hill
a) To LUND WASHINGTON, Camp at Cambridge, August 20, 1775.
“The People of this government have obtained a Character which they by no means deserved; their officers generally speaking are the most indifferent kind of People I ever saw. I have already broke one Colo. and five Captains for Cowardice and for drawing more Pay and Provisions than they had Men in their Companies; there is two more Colos. now under arrest, and to be tried for the same offences; in short they are by no means such Troops, in any respect, as you are led to believe of them from the accts. which are published, but I need not make myself Enemies among them, by this declaration, although it is consistent with truth. I dare say the Men would fight very well (if properly Officered) although they are an exceeding dirty and nasty people; had they been properly conducted at Bunkers Hill (on the 17th of June) or those that were there properly supported, the Regulars would have met with a shameful defeat, and a much more considerable loss than they did, which is now known to be exactly 1057 killed and wounded; it was for their behaviour on that occasion that the above Officers were broke, for I never spared one that was accused of Cowardice but brot ‘em to immediate Tryal.”
6. Hospital
a) To THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS, January 26, 1777.
“I hope your new appointment . . . will make the necessary reform in the hospital and that I shall not, the next campaign, have my ears and eyes too, shocked with the complaints and looks of poor creatures perishing for want of proper care.”
7. Military Family/Band of Brothers
a) To HENRY KNOX, October 21, 1798.
“My first wish would be, that my military family and the whole army should consider themselves as a band of brothers, willing and ready to die for each other.”
8. Promotions
a) To THE COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS WITH THE ARMY, [Head Quarters, January 29, 1778.]
“Irregular promotions have also been a pregnant source of uneasiness, discord and perplexity in this army.…This, however, shows how indespensably necessary it is, to have some settled rule of promotion, universally known and understood and not to be deviated from, but for obvious and incontestible reasons.”
9. Tensions with General Gates
a) To JOHN JAY, [Head Quarters, Middle brook, April 14, 1779.]
“I discovered very early in the war symptoms of coldness and constraint in General Gates behavior to me. These increased as he rose into greater consequence; but we did not come to a direct breach, ‘till the beginning of last year. This was occasioned, by a correspondence, which I thought rather made free with me between General Gates and Conway, which accidentally came to my knowledge. The particulars of this affair you will find delineated in the packet herewith indorsed “papers respecting General Conway.” Besides the evidence contained in them of the genuineness of the offensive correspondence, I have other proofs still more convincing, which, having been given me in a confidential way, I am not at liberty to impart.
“After this affair subsided, I made a point of treating Genl. Gates with all the attention and cordiality in my power, as well from a sincere desire of harmony, as from an unwillingness to give any cause of triumph to our enemies from an appearance of dissension among ourselves. I can appeal to the world and to the whole Army whether I have not cautiously avoided every word or hint that could tend to disparage General Gates in any way. I am sorry his conduct to me has not been equally generous and that he is continually giving me fresh proofs of malevolence and opposition. It will not be doing him injustice to say, that, besides the little underhand intrigues, which he is frequently practising, there has hardly been any great military question, in which his advice has been asked, that it has not been given in an equivocal and designing manner, apparently calculated to afford him an opportunity of censuring me on the failure of whatever measure might be adopted.
“When I find that this Gentleman does not scruple to take the most unfair advantages of me; I am under a necessity of explaining his conduct to justify my own. This and the perfect confidence I have in you have occasioned me to trouble you with so free a communication of the state of things between us. I shall still be as passive as a regard to my own character will permit. I am however uneasy as General — has endeavoured to impress Congress with an unfavourable idea of me, and as I only know this in a private confidential way, that I cannot take any step to remove the impression, if it should be made.”
10. General Conway’s Secret Enemy
a) To MAJOR GENERAL HORATIO GATES, Valley Forge, January 4, 1778. vol. 10. “…given with a friendly view to forewarn, and consequently forearm me, against a secret enemy; or, in other words, a dangerous incendiary; in which character, sooner or later, this Country will know Genl. Conway.”
